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Abstract 
In this model the basic ensemble consists of a source and a sink, three 
basic ensembles constitute an organism or company (both an ensemble 
of ensembles) and nine organisms/companies form a population or a 
branch of industry. Each organism is composed of either connected or 
unconnected ensembles. Linear cost-functions and saturating benefit-
functions create superadditivity (better net profit) through a rational and 
peaceful transfer of substrate within a basic ensemble. Transfers by 
force and deception are not jet considered. All ensembles have an 
identical and limited concentration range and all concentrations are of 
the same probability. Random mutations change cost factors (cf), 
Michaelis-Menten constants (Km) and the maximal reaction velocities 
(Vmax) in source and sink of the basic ensemble. Km and Vmax shape a 
saturating benefit-function in Michaelis-Menten type enzyme kinetics 
resembling the utility function in economics. The result of mutations in 
the basic ensemble is a higher or lower cumulative superadditivity of an 
organism/company and its master if installed. The most effective 
organisms or masters prevail within the population. Recombination of 
ensembles between organisms accelerates evolution. Independent of the 
starting point and with or without a fix cost I observe the evolution 
towards strong asymmetry and inequality with a division of labour 
resulting in the development of a collector and a manufacturer. Although 
I observe a win-win situation reciprocity will become a necessity.  
ensemble, transfer space, benefit, cost, utility, net profit, mutation, recombination, 
division of labour, asymmetry, inequality, quantity to quality transition, complexity  
Resume of the old and static model  
Source and sink are important concepts in Physics (Thermodynamics, 
Electronics) and especially Biology (1, 2); in Economics (business 
management) this concept is used, too (3). In the past I investigated 
simple ensembles consisting of only one source and one sink. Source 
and sink use the same substrate which has a benefit aspect and a cost 
aspect simultaneously. The different parameters of the benefit-function 
and the cost-function are fixed and stay unchanged over time (4). 
The cost-function (c) is linear and calculated from the simple biochemical 
parameter substrate concentration [S] with the dimension millimolar 
(mM) and a cost factor cf with the dimension cost per millimolar (c/mM). 
The result is a linear function with the dimension cost (c). A fix cost (fc) 
was and is only included when specifically mentioned.    
c = [S] (mM) * cf (c/mM)  
The benefit is related to a product made from the substrate. The 
biochemical equivalent to the productivity of benefit (b) is the reaction 
rate V (velocity in micromoles per minute). The rate is calculated from 
the Michaelis-Menten equation. The benefit factor bf has the dimension 
benefit times minutes per micromole. The result is a saturating function 
with the dimension b. This function resembles the utility function in 
economics. Km is an enzyme-typical constant (dimension millimolar, 
mM). Vmax is the maximal reaction velocity in micromoles per minute. 
b = V (µm/min) * bf (b*min/µm); V = [S]/(Km+[S]) * Vmax (µm/min)   
Every substrate has simultaneously both features: benefit and cost. 
When the substrate concentration (amount per volume) will increase, 
source and sink will change from benefit domination to cost domination 
(figure 1). Benefit and cost are place-holders and could be measured 
themselves in other units like Euro (€) or kilojoule (kJ). When benefit and 
cost are of identical quality we can subtract them and learn whether cost 
or benefit will dominate: € or kJ earned (b) - € or kJ spent (c).  
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Figure 1 
A source or a sink will appear in three different conditions depending on the 
concentration of substrate. At low substrate concentration we observe benefit 
domination (b-c>0), at high substrate concentration we will observe cost domination 
(b-c<0) and both areas are separated by a point where benefit and cost are of 
identical size (b-c=0). 
 
When two parties come together with unequal distribution of substrate 
there will be the possibility of a peaceful and rational transfer from the 
side with cost domination (high substrate concentration - a source, b<c) 
to the side with benefit domination (low substrate concentration - a sink, 
b>c) (figure 2, green arrow). The source will get rid of a large cost 
although there is a small loss in benefit and the sink will gain a big 
benefit although there is a small gain in cost. The result for the ensemble 
of both can be quantified as a net profit. The net profit for the ensemble 
will be positive and superadditive if the benefit of source minus cost of 
source plus benefit of sink minus cost of sink is larger after the transfer 
than before. If we observe the net profit before and after a transfer for a 
whole concentration range in source and sink the results are different 
surfaces within the transfer space (figure 2 right, 4). His coordinates are 
substrate concentration in source and sink and net profit of the ensemble 
of both. The volume between the two surfaces is positive or negative and 
is integrated from 1000*1000 columns with the volume np*mM2. 
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Figure 2 
The peaceful and rational transfer (green arrow, left) of substrate from source with 
cost domination (b-c<0) to sink with benefit domination (b-c>0) will result in 
superadditivity (green surface on the right) in comparison to no transfer (red surface 
on the right; simple additivity of net profit in source and sink). This can be visualized 
in the three-dimensional transfer space (right). The volume between the green and 
the red surface is the total superadditive net profit after all transfers within a certain 
concentration range. Symmetric ensembles (this figure) have identical benefit and 
cost-functions in source and sink, asymmetric ensembles differ at least in one of the 
function parameters (cost factor, benefit factor, Km value, Vmax value). The little red 
arrows indicate an identically sized decrease of substrate concentration in source 
and increase in sink after a transfer of substrate within the closed system. The 
simultaneous arrival at b=c is only possible in one single point (strict symbiosis). 
Usually one side will not reach b=c because the other has already arrived at b=c; the 
starting point of force and deception. The total amount of substrate within the 
ensemble stays unchanged. Substrate is just rearranged between two 
compartments. 
In the case of a peaceful transfer there will be only larger net profits 
(superadditivity) in comparison to no transfer. The ensemble is only 
active when rational (figure 2, green surface always on top); two Homo 
Economicus in action. 
Complexity develops by asymmetric features of the ensemble (5) or 
through the existence of entanglement between source and sink. There, 
a partial or complete informational identity (genetic relationship) makes it 
necessary to consider besides a quantitative balance of the net profit 
also a qualitative balance of the net profit (6). Further complexity arises 
from the use of force and deception within the ensemble (7, 8).  
Besides independent ensembles there are dependent ensembles 
controlled by a master. In well informed and strong ensembles (two 
Homo Economicus, an ideal) a transfer will never be due to force and 
deception. Therefore, the transfer is based on rationality (get rid of 
substrate in cost domination, gain substrate in benefit domination) and 
results in a win-win situation characterized by superadditivity only. Not 
only both sides are unable to force or deceive each other also the master 
is unable to subjugate source and/or sink. In such a case of equally 
strong and rational parties he can only act as honest broker. All 
ensembles oft this paper will be peaceful ensembles. In case of a master 
a brokerage fee is not included with exception of one example. In 
asymmetric ensembles or in symmetric ensembles with force or 
deception used by source or sink or the master there will be additional 
superadditivity but also subadditivity (7, 8). The evolution of ensembles 
learning to use force and deception is investigated in a separate paper.  
When we look top down onto the transfer space we look at a surface 
(mM2) with the coordinates of the substrate concentration in source (0-
5mM) and in sink (0-5mM). In the example of figure 3 we look at an 
asymmetric ensemble. The concentration plain is cut into 4 unequal 
areas (area I to IV) by two red lines. The red lines are formed by 
concentrations where benefit of source minus cost of source or benefit of 
sink minus cost of sink are zero. Benefit minus cost in source and sink 
are zero simultaneously in one point. This point will be located for all 
symmetric ensembles on the light blue line; the line of mixing of 
substrate which could be also called the line of strict equivalence for 
them. However, not all ensembles with the point bso-cso=bsi-csi=0 on the 
blue line will be symmetric. 
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Figure 3 
A top down look on the transfer space. The dimension net profit points towards the 
observer. As example we look at an asymmetric ensemble where cost factor, benefit 
factor, Km value and Vmax value differ in source and sink. The red arrows point at 
red lines where in source or in sink benefit and cost are equal. The orange arrow 
points at the only point where in source and in sink benefit and cost are equal. The 
light blue line is the line of strict equivalence for symmetric ensembles. The green 
area is the area I with a peaceful and rational transfer. In the absence of force and 
deception the ensemble is only active in area I although all concentrations (0-5mM) 
have the same probability.  
Certain asymmetric ensembles (5) also fall on this blue line but then we 
will also observe a partial subadditivity in area I. This will happen when 
Km, Vmax, and cf in source and sink are in a typical size relation:  
A highly productive source is over-saturated (b<c, very low Km, low 
Vmax) with a very cheap substrate (very small cf) and therefore the low-
cost substrate is transferred at free will and completely rational for both 
sides (area I) to a still unsaturated sink. In case this substrate is for the 
low productive and very unsaturated sink (b>c, very high Km and high 
Vmax) of a very high cost (very high cf) we are going to observe 
“rational” subadditivity. At certain transfer sizes the gain in source by 
getting rid of cost domination and the gain in sink by benefit domination 
is a loss for the ensemble of both. Both have an advantage of the 
transfer but the combined net profits are smaller after the transfer than 
before. An example for a negative outcome of two rational decisions. We 
should not forget that we look at a two-dimensional (figure 3) projection 
of a three-dimensional space (figure 2) with many independent features: 
two independent substrate concentrations, two independent Km and 
Vmax values and two independent cost factors and two independent 
benefit factors. Peaceful ensembles and peaceful masters are active 
only in area I; they are not necessarily always superadditive (5) when 
they act rational.  
As there will be several different ensembles with the same two-
dimensional appearance we can only discriminate them by their amount 
of net profit, the dimension pointing in the direction of the observer. This 
discrimination would be possible with the introduction of a net profit 
vector in a net profit space. Many problems appear only when higher 
dimensional phenomena are observed in a lower dimensional space. 
Design of an evolving model 
In my past papers and calculations all parameters (cf, bf, Km, Vmax) 
were fixed and the ensembles were static over time and very simple. The 
following modifications are added: 
a. I am locking at an organism/company as an ensemble of 
ensembles. I observe the success of the organism within a 
population competing for better net profit over the course of many 
generations. The selection will favour organisms or masters of 
such organisms with the highest superadditivity from area I. Neither 
the single ensemble nor source or sink will compete with their 
counterparts in other organisms; they are completely shielded. 
b. I am going to mutate cf, Km and Vmax in source and sink. The 
benefit factor stays in most cases fixed with a value of 1 
(b*min/µm). A mutational step will be either up or down for the 
values of cf, Km and Vmax. The mutational step size is picked from 
a normal distribution with an expected value 0 and a standard 
deviation of 0.001 for cf and 0.01 for Km and Vmax. Some values 
like Km in sink will decrease during evolution towards higher net 
profit but negative values are excluded; the lowest value is set to 
0.0001. Out of the nine organism of the population the three best 
(highest net profit) will be allowed to have one offspring each. The 
next three organisms in rank will survive and the three lowest in 
rank will die. One third of the population will be mutated per 
generation and pairs of two individuals will recombine a transfer 
space within the same position. 
c. Peaceful independent ensembles and dependent ensembles with a 
peaceful master are indistinguishable when the master is not 
collecting a brokerage fee. However, a concentration independent 
brokerage fee could be interpreted as a fix cost to the ensemble. 
d. The benefit factor is used in some cases as an indicator and 
measure of the complexity level. Then bf is set to a fixed value 
larger than 1 but not by a mutation. 
 
The basic level is the known ensemble represented by a single transfer 
space (figure 4A). Three ensembles form an organism (a company), an 
ensemble of ensembles. There are two basic types of organisms. The 
two different types are an unconnected type (figure 4B) and a connected 
type (figure 4C).  
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Figure 4 
A. The basic ensemble consists of source (so) and sink (si). Input is substrate 
concentration in source (0-5mM) and substrate concentration in sink (0-5mM). The 
output is a concentration dependent superadditive net profit (be-ce) of the ensemble. 
B. An organism (ensemble of ensembles) composed of three ensembles. The 
ensembles are not connected. The superadditivity of the organism is obtained by 
adding up the single superadditivity of the three ensembles. The size of the sum 
(green arrow) will decide whether the organism will survive (the master will succeed) 
and have offspring or will only survive or is going to die.  
C. A different type of organism (ensemble of ensembles) composed of three 
connected ensembles. The two basic ensembles feed as source and sink with their 
superadditivity a third ensemble. The size of the superadditivity of the last ensemble 
(green arrow) will decide whether this organism will survive (the master will succeed) 
and have offspring or will only survive or is going to die. 
Within the unconnected type three ensembles produce net profit from 
their own pool of substrate and collectively contribute to the total net 
profit of the organism, a sum of single net profits. Within the connected 
type the ensembles are arranged in a pyramidal shape. The two 
ensembles at the bottom produce net profit from their substrate pool. In 
each ensemble the net profit is calculated in small concentration intervals 
(100*0.05mM steps, 10 000 concentration pairs) and handed over to the 
ensemble on the top as a separate amount of net profit (10 000 
portions). One of the lower ensembles will always give its superadditive 
net profit to the source side of the top ensemble and the other will give 
the superadditive net profit always to the sink side of the top ensemble. 
The top ensemble will produce also superadditive net profit from the 
portions of the lower ensembles. These portions have a frequency 
distribution. Their value at the higher level is assessed by the benefit 
factor there, bf>1. The final superadditive net profit of the top ensemble 
is the measure for the success of the organism or the master. The top 
ensemble is not the master as per definition (7) a third-party master is 
not directly involved in the production of net profit; he is either a peaceful 
and honest broker bringing source and sink together or he is using force 
and deception to induce a transfer of substrate within the ensemble. A 
master using force and deception will be the protagonist of the next 
paper. There are two additional types of masters which are also not 
considered here, the source as master of the sink or the sink as a master 
of the source (7). They are a part of the ensemble and therefore they 
experience the effect of their action on the net profit of the ensemble. A 
third-party master will be able to uncouple his success for some time 
from the success of an ensemble (8 and paper in preparation). The 
population is formed by 9 organisms. The population will either consist 
only of organisms with unconnected ensembles or with connected 
ensembles (figure 5). 
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Figure 5 
Two different populations. The green arrows indicate the different sizes of 
superadditive net profit coming out of each organism. 
A: The population consists completely of organisms with unconnected ensembles. 
The basic ensemble is mutated (cf, Km, Vmax in source and sink). Recombination is 
possible between basic ensembles of the same level (yellow arrows). All 
independent, basic ensembles contribute to the total result of the organism.  
B: The population consists completely of organisms with connected ensembles. The 
basic ensemble is mutated (cf, Km, Vmax in source and sink). Recombination is 
possible only between basic ensembles of the same level and the same function as 
e.g. a provider from sink of the top ensemble (yellow arrows). The benefit factor in 
the top ensemble is a measure of the leverage due to complexity. The final result of 
the organism is the net profit of the top ensemble.  
 
Recombination events are only possible within the same level and 
function of the basic ensembles. Recombination could also be made on 
the level of the single kinetic values (bf, cf, Km, Vmax) but is not used 
here. The aim is to avoid conflicting effects resulting from mixing features 
of a source with features of a sink. In nature such negative effects are 
avoided by mating barriers, species formation and other forms of 
segregation. 
Results and Discussion 
Organisms with unconnected basic ensembles: 
The criterion for survival of a single organism or the master of a single 
organism in a population of similar entities is the sum of the 
superadditivity produced in the three basic ensembles. The 
concentration range for all 27 basic ensembles in the population is 0-
5mM. The mutations take place on the level of cf, Vmax and Km in 
source and sink in a total of 162 places. The direction of the change is 
random. However, a decrease in superadditivity will eliminate the 
mutation from the population. Recombination is performed on the level of 
the basic ensemble.  
All 9 organisms start at the same initial starting point.  Due to mutations 
the parameters cf, Km and Vmax in source and sink of all basic 
ensembles in every organism within the population are changing. 
Although all concentrations have the same probability the ensemble is 
only active in area I. There, the source is characterized by cost 
domination and the sink by benefit domination. 
On the first glance it would be expected that cost for every single party 
(source or sink) should be low (cf small) and the benefit should be high 
(low Km, high Vmax) to have a large benefit after the cost is subtracted – 
a large net profit. In an ensemble this is different. The ensemble has a 
strong internal asymmetry even if it is symmetric according to the 
parameters. There is only one peaceful way for source to give and for 
sink to take. Source must be cost dominated and sink must be benefit 
dominated. Only then we will observe activity and superadditivity within 
the peaceful ensemble. To increase this superadditivity more substrate 
must be given peacefully from source to sink. This will only happen when 
source gives more while sink is able to take more. To make source give 
more and sink take more mutations must increase cost in source and 
decrease cost in sink, increase Km in source and decrease Km in sink 
and finally decrease Vmax in source and increase Vmax in sink. 
However, this is assumption is not completely identical to the 
observations in the course of evolution here (figure 6). 
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Figure 6 
Here we observe the evolution of the mean values within a population of 9 organisms 
with 9*3 identical, asymmetric ensembles as starting point (generation 0) according 
to: a, Vmax source; b, Vmax sink; c, cost sink; d, cost source; e, Km source; f, Km 
sink. The values are an average of the population and show the development during 
2000 generations in the absence of recombination. With recombination the increase 
or decrease is steeper. 
 
I observe partially an unexpected behaviour. In source, as expected, 
Vmax drops, cost is increasing and Km is also increasing but after about 
700 generations (in this example) Km is starting to decrease. In sink we 
observe besides an expected behaviour (Vmax increasing, cf decreasing 
and Km initially decreasing) after about 100 generations an increasing 
Km (figure 6). Why is Km in both parties behaving so surprisingly by 
changing the direction of evolution? A Km decrease has a larger effect 
on the productivity in lower concentrations and a Vmax increase has a 
larger effect at higher concentrations. In addition, I set the mutational 
step size in cost to a small value. An increase in Km looks like a 
decrease in cost. Km in source is at first increasing, helping to transfer 
substrate from source to sink. At this generation time there are in source 
only large substrate concentrations (near 5mM). During the evolution of 
the system area I will increase in surface and include also smaller 
substrate concentrations for source and much larger concentrations for 
sink. Then Km for source will decrease because it has now a more 
important additional effect on “increasing cost” helping to transfer to sink. 
The explanation for the behaviour of Km in sink follows the opposite idea 
(low concentrations in the beginning). Despite this unexpected behaviour 
of the Km value the overall increase in net profit is impressive.  
The different velocity of the evolutionary progress in ensembles with 
recombination in contrast to ensembles without recombination is 
expected. It is known in Biology that recombination accelerates evolution 
(9, figure 7). In case there are early different mutations e.g. decreasing 
Km in several sinks, the result is an advantage to every affected sink and 
its ensemble. Recombination will bring together such advantageous 
mutations of different levels into one organism.  
A mutational step in sink increasing the net profit of the ensemble will 
increase benefit domination in sink. A mutational step in source 
increasing the net profit of the ensemble will increase the cost 
domination in source. Therefore, source must be completely protected 
from competition with other sources. We observe a non-linear and then a 
linear phase of the graphs in figure 7.  The linear phase seems to be a 
speed limit (np*mM2/generation = const.) in later generations when cost 
domination in source and benefit domination in sink have grown in those 
asymmetric ensembles. The speed limit depends on evolutionary velocity 
(with or without recombination). The loss of net profit in source and the 
gain (overcompensation) in sink correlate in a linear fashion.   
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Figure 7 
Here we observe the evolution of increasing superadditivity (average of the whole 
population) without recombination (blue) and with recombination (red). Both are from 
the same starting point of an asymmetric ensemble (figure 6). The y-coordinate has a 
step size of 10mM2*np (np, net profit of the ensemble of ensembles). The x 
coordinate is the generation time (4000 generations, same scale).  
 
The increase in net profit is due to an increase of area I, the area of cost 
domination in source and benefit domination in sink. Now it would be 
interesting to learn in which way the shape of area I is changing. 
Therefore, the point bso-cso=bsi-csi=0 (figure 3) is observed and his 
movement during evolution of a peaceful ensemble. This is a very simple 
and straight forward approach. A more general idea would be a net profit 
vector for every concentration pair. The size of the vector is the net profit 
and the direction would be determined by the tanα of substrate 
concentration in source/substrate concentration in sink. The vectors of all 
pairs form the vector field. As long as the vector is outside of area I he 
would have the value zero. As soon as the concentration pair would fall 
into the growing area I we would observe the vector and could follow his 
increase. However, I prefer to follow the point bso-cso=bsi-csi=0. 
We start with 25 symmetric and asymmetric ensembles (figure 8). They 
all are characterized by the different starting position of the points where 
bso-cso=bsi-csi=0. They all differ with respect to Km and have identical 
values of cf=1 and Vmax=5. During the evolution towards higher net 
profit all 25*9*3*2*3 different values are changed by random mutation 
and recombination. I am going to observe how the path of bso-cso=bsi-
csi=0 is behaving during evolution towards higher net profit. 
All ensembles, wherever they start, develop towards complete 
asymmetry. The source evolves in a way that the substrate there is 
collected and then handed over to sink where the production of net profit 
takes place. At the end of our observation of the evolutionary process at 
5000 generations the source practically does no longer keep substrate 
for its on productivity. Although many ensembles cross or start at the 
blue line of strict equivalence they don’t stay there. The source becomes 
a collector of substrate and sink a place of main productivity of net profit 
(figure 8). 
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Figure 8 
Here, we observe 25 points: bso-cso=bsi-csi=0 (figure 3) over the course of 5000 
generations. The units of the two-dimensional coordinate system are mM substrate in 
y direction for source and x for sink. The asymmetric or symmetric ensembles start at 
25 concentration pairs of source and sink: from 0.5mM/0.5mM to 4.5mM/4.5mM with 
steps of 1mM. The dimension net profit points towards the observer. The net profit 
increases from left to right and from top to bottom along the course of the red and 
blue lines. The dark blue lines – no recombination, the red lines – with recombination, 
light blue diagonal line – line of strict equivalence. All symmetric ensembles start on 
the blue diagonal. In sink the concentration limit of 5mM is exceeded to indicate the 
further development. When all substrate in source (max. 5mM) is transferred to sink 
(there then maximal 10mM) the process comes to an end. 
 
At the end of the development b-c>0 in source becomes very small. The 
loss of the source seems a possibility. However, this will be prevented 
by:   
a. the service of source stays necessary as only the source is equipped 
to collect the substrate that is available to source;  
b. source could be sustained by direct reciprocity through sharing part of 
the superadditive net profit of sink;  
c. a high degree of biological reciprocity (genetic entanglement, 6), a lost 
source will always be replaced in the same process that will produce a 
new sink;  
d. evolutionary pressure is only acting on the ensemble as a whole. 
 
The source can´t be omitted as its service is still needed – not it´s 
productivity. The strong and effective asymmetry which is evolving will 
not be for free to the ensemble. There is no difference in the 
development with or without recombination. Following all the single paths 
towards asymmetry we can´t observe a suboptimum or a very different 
path towards the final endpoint. Recombination only accelerates the 
development of asymmetry leading faster to higher net profit. The red 
paths may indicate some degree of sidedness of the transfer space. 
The progress of a starting point bso-cso=bsi-csi=0 at 0.5mM/0.5mM is 
mainly in the sink direction (to the “right”) while the progress of a starting 
point bso-cso=bsi-csi=0 at 4.5mM/4.5mM is mainly in the source direction 
(“downwards”). This is an indicator for the strong internal asymmetry of 
the transfer space. The reason is that at low concentrations of substrate 
in source and sink (0.5/0.5) an increase in net profit by any mutational 
step is larger in the direction of sink while at high concentrations of 
substrate in source and sink (4.5/4.5) an improvement of net profit by 
any mutation is larger in direction of source. 
The evolutionary process detects the internal asymmetry although the 
outside seems to be symmetric. The same concentration range for 
source and sink.  
Better ensembles will replace other ensembles with lower superadditivity. 
The appearance of subadditivity in area I through mutational steps 
according to 5 will not survive as the total net-profit will decrease. A 
decreased net profit is going to be eliminated in an evolutionary process 
for improved net profit. 
The activity of a peaceful master could be interpreted as a fix cost 
(brokerage fee). In figure 9 it is observed what happens to two 
asymmetric and one symmetric ensemble. However, the situation here is 
more difficult as we have additional points where bso-cso=bsi-csi=0 (figure 
9, insets). For simplicity the old point only is observed. This time the path 
of the ensembles reasonably avoids the neighbourhood of the symmetric 
fix cost (fc) of 0.5 (c=cf*[S]+fc).  
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Figure 9 
Again, the behaviour of the point bso-cso=bsi-csi=0 (figure 3) over the course of 5000 
generations is observed in three ensembles with a symmetric fix cost. The insets 
symbolize the starting point of area I of the three ensembles. We see the green area 
I from variable cost and a small additional area where a transfer of the fix cost would 
bring additional net profit.  
Organisms with connected basic ensembles: 
This is the chapter to think about the benefit factor in more detail. A 
substrate is a Janus-headed thing. It looks on one side into the past 
where there are costs connected to the acquisition and ownership of the 
substrate. This is taken into account by a cost factor “cf”. On the other 
side the substrate looks into the future where the enzymatic 
transformation (or the manufacturing) will create a benefit from this 
substrate. This is taken into account by a benefit factor “bf”.  
Up to know the benefit factor was primarily used to get rid of 
physicochemical dimensions (min, µm) and to arrive at the dimension 
and placeholder “b”. In a connected ensemble (figure 4c) we look at a 
hierarchy of a production chain (enzymes in a cell or people in a 
company). The character of the substrates and materials along the 
production line change and increase in value and complexity but they 
may decrease in amount. 500 amino acids are assembled by different 
catalysts to form one protein molecule with a feature not available to all 
amino acids. More than 10 000 different parts are assembled by workers 
to form one car with a new feature emerging. The benefit factor is used 
to account for the increase in value, the change in character, the 
increase in complexity, and the loss in amount.  
The benefit factor starts in this two-layered ensemble of ensembles with 
a value of 1 for the basic substrate and will increase with the next step in 
the production line. A first interpretation of the superadditive net profit of 
the basic layer: The superadditive net profit (mM2*np) of the lower level 
could be viewed as a new substrate (mM) to the higher level; a change 
of character and maybe amount. A second interpretation: The 
superadditive net profit (mM2*np) of the lower level is due to a better 
efficiency after transfer within those ensembles. Better efficiency could 
be used to save substrate at the lower level. The same but now saved 
substrate (mM) is available to the higher level. The effect of 10mmoles of 
glucose on the growth of claws will be different from the effect of 
10mmoles of glucose in a brain – not necessarily but hopefully with a 
higher value in the brain. The now saved substrate in the ensembles of a 
lower level has a higher leverage at a higher level but will also be of 
smaller amount. In the following connected ensembles bf is simply used 
to adjust the value of the superadditive net profit of a lower level 
ensemble and compensate for the loss in amount. Therefore, a change 
to e.g. lower Km values is not necessary. After the size of bf is adjusted 
accordingly bf stays fixed. The benefit factor is not part of the 
evolutionary process as is the cost factor. This time the path of the point 
bso-cso=bsi-csi=0 during evolution is observed as an average again. 
However, we look at the average of the source-supplier and the sink-
supplier of the top ensemble and the top ensemble separately. The 
superadditive net profit in the lower levels is calculated from 100 
concentration steps (0mM-5mM, 50µM steps) and transfers from source 
to 100 concentration steps (0mM-5mM, 50µM steps) in sink. All 100*100 
net profits (mM2*np) of the lower level are converted to a concentration 
(mM) and multiplied by the same benefit factor (here 6) to maximally 
reach a “benefit concentration” of 5mM again. The result is a 
concentration range between 0mM and 5mM with a frequency 
distribution inherited from the lower level. All three ensembles still evolve 
with mutations in cf, Km and Vmax. The superadditive net profit of the 
top ensemble is also determined by integration of 100*100 columns and 
decides which organism is going to survive and have offspring, is only 
surviving or is going to die. Only asymmetric ensembles (bso-cso=bsi-csi=0, 
4mM source/1mM sink,) on all levels are observed. The ensembles 
evolve either without (figure 10) or with (figure 11) recombination. 
Figure 10 
 
Figure 10 
Evolutionary paths of a connected ensemble of ensembles with mutation only are 
observed. The paths are basically the evolution of the point bso-cso=bsi-csi=0 in the 
three connected ensembles over the course of 5000 generations within the 
concentration range of 5mM in source (y) and sink (x). The averages of groups of 
nine ensembles are displayed: blue - average of nine top ensembles, brown - 
average of nine ensembles providing the source side of the top ensemble, black - 
average of nine ensembles providing the sink side of the top ensembles.  
 
Now, in the course of 5000 generations the concentration range 
(5mM*5mM) is not left. The three paths appear erratic which is owed to 
the fact of a quite coarse calculation with steps of 50µM in combination 
with the interdependence of the mutations. The path direction of the top 
ensemble differs from the two paths of the supplier ensembles. The 
probability of all concentrations for the suppliers is the same. The top 
ensemble sees a frequency distribution. This distribution has the effect 
as different probabilities for certain concentration pairs would have.    
In figure 11 the erratic behaviour is again observable. More important is 
the fact that recombination with its faster development identifies certain 
points bso-cso=bsi-csi=0 as optimal (star like appearance at the end). 
Figure 11 
 
Figure 11 
Evolutionary paths of a connected ensemble of ensembles with mutation and 
recombination are observed. The paths are basically the evolution of the point bso-
cso=bsi-csi=0 in the three connected ensembles over the course of 5000 generations 
within the concentration range of 5mM in source (y) and sink (x). The averages of 
groups of nine ensembles are displayed: red - average of nine top ensembles, brown 
- average of nine ensembles providing the source side of the top ensemble, black - 
average of nine ensembles providing the sink side of the top ensembles.  
 
A specific area I belongs to such points. This area does no longer grow. 
The net profit coming out of this area seems to be optimal with respect to 
the top ensemble and is growing further within those limits. The 
development of division of labour comes to an end. A further change in 
net profit and division of labour of the lower level ensembles is also 
punished. This roots in the unequal distribution of concentration pairs 
coming out of the suppliers. The evolutionary feed-back between the top 
ensemble and the supplier ensembles also stops the development. The 
reason, however, lies within the ensemble and not in a probabilistic 
structure of the outside world.  
General Discussion: 
I have to emphasize that I am dealing here with a special case. We 
observe the behaviour of ensembles where source is benefit dominated 
and sink is cost dominated. The transfer will usually leave one side 
unsatisfied in a sense that all substrate that could be given or taken will 
not be taken or given. As soon as source is no longer cost dominated or 
sink is no longer benefit dominated transfer will stop completely whatever 
the other side would like to do. There will be no use of force and 
deception. We are dealing with an ensemble of two absolutely strong 
(can´t be forced) and completely informed (can´t be deceived) entities – 
two Homo Economicus. This ideal type of ensemble is only active in area 
I although all concentrations (concentration pairs) have the same 
probability.  
The ability of source in the observed evolutionary process of the 
unconnected ensembles to endlessly worsen its own productivity by 
decreasing Vmax, increasing cost and changing Km appears insane. 
However, I observe a special case in a consequent way. It is not even 
necessary to locate source in direction of a substrate stream and shield 
the sink from this stream as all concentrations have the same probability. 
However, if this shielding from substrate would be the case we could 
observe the formation of a specialized (absorptive) tissues from an 
initially undifferentiated and completely symmetrical chunk of identical 
cells. But even a specialized tissue will need some basic residual 
productivity for itself. On the other side the increase in productivity is also 
insane. Sinks with a more complex structure will not be prepared for 
such a massive flow-through of substrate being converted to huge 
amounts of product and then handed over somewhere – possibly 
unprepared. The underlying, not yet adapted physical structures may 
finally fail. The model needs internal limits but we can already learn 
something. 
In some examples we have obviously observed the development from a 
completely symmetric and equal condition to an asymmetric, unequal 
condition. Asymmetry, inequality and division of labour can be found on 
different levels of complexity.  
A case of symmetry breaking and a division of labour has recently been 
described in a model on the molecular level within an RNA-world setting 
(10). The model starts from a symmetric situation where the molecules 
have conflicting aims: minimize self-replication to increase “altruistic” 
catalysis and maximize selfish self-replication, one strand of the 
molecules remains catalytic and increases its copy number (enzyme-like 
molecules), whereas the other becomes non-catalytic and decreases its 
copy number (genome-like molecules). This asymmetry will increase the 
equilibrium cellular fitness. Both strands are a source and a sink at the 
same time. The catalytic active molecule is the source of products and a 
sink of information; on the other side the genome like molecule is the 
sink of products and the source of information. Therefore, they show a 
high degree of reciprocity and - never to forget - they are complementary 
strands. The character of reciprocity must not necessarily be of identical 
quality or quantity from molecules to higher animals (11) including 
primates.  
Multicellular organisms are basically a clone of identical (equal, 
symmetric) cells. This seems to be sufficient in the beginning to gain an 
advantage over single celled organisms. In the course of evolution this 
equality is lost due to internal specialisation and division of labour (12, 
13). On an even higher level of complexity animal societies like bees and 
ants show a great degree of division of labour (14). Here, we observe 
one party collecting food and another party producing offspring. This 
relationship is stable as there is a huge degree of biological reciprocity 
(entanglement, 6). In addition, selection will be active mainly on the level 
of the whole ensemble. While an old interpretation was that the workers 
work for the queen, a different interpretation is also possible. The 
workers could be interpreted as a party producing younger sisters via the 
queen with a higher genetic similarity than own offspring would have 
(15). However, both is a misunderstanding of a two-dimensional entity in 
the three-dimensional ensemble. The old problem of conflicting micro-
economic considerations and a macro-economic consideration. 
Howsoever the original human societies may have locked like with 
different functional roles of male and female, old and young, hunter and 
non-hunter, gatherer and non-gatherer, today human societies are quite 
unequal with respect to many features (division of labour, distribution of 
wealth). The reasons of this inequality and the size of this inequality are 
under debate and contaminated with political aims and ideology. But 
even on the most basic level we already observe inequality and division 
of labour in man – our handedness (16).  
Above I have described and discussed asymmetry and division of labour 
on different levels of complexity. Biologists are convinced that there are 
several major evolutionary transitions (17, 18) between those levels. The 
question is: Why do biologic and also economic systems (19) become 
more and more complex over time? On every level of molecular, 
organismic or economic complexity I see ensembles of sources and 
sinks. The simple examples are here the unconnected ensembles. They 
may just grow in size and number adding more and more unconnected 
parts. That is not jet a transition, it is only an increase in quantity which 
may look complex. 
In the case of connected ensembles, we observe a really complex 
situation. Two ensembles of source and sink are themselves part of a 
new ensemble as source and sink; a transition. The new ensemble is 
more complex and becomes more integrated by limited increase in 
division of labour. The connected ensemble of ensembles is a model 
very similar to production chains and food chains. Both are basically 
pyramids with entities of small size but high number and low complexity 
at the bottom and a small amount of highly complex and quite large 
entities at the top. In Biology the substrate of a higher level is usually a 
highly complex ensemble of ensembles itself which is going to be 
disassembled before the smallest components are being reassembled to 
become part of the higher level (exceptions: e.g. slave holders – man 
and some ants). The benefit factor is a measure to what extend quantity 
is transformed into quality (20, 21) and the higher level is the place 
where it is decided whether this transformation is large enough to result 
in a superadditive net-profit. The benefit factor serves as a complexity 
indicator but not as complexity explainer. Explanation comes from the 
overall structure (connectiveness, information), the size relation of cost 
and benefit factors, and Km and Vmax in source and sink. Therefore, the 
benefit factor resembles the term “transformity”, a scaling factor 
introduced by D. M. Scienceman and H. T. Odum.  
It should be clear that my model of three connected ensembles and two 
layers is only a starting point for much more complex applications using 
this model as a building block. The combinatorial potential of a more 
complex pyramid is very large especially as top levels may support 
sources or sinks in other levels of different range-depth. It is also 
imaginable to feed several top ensembles into one source or sink of a 
next level and make the assignment of the connections (the silk roads) 
between the ensembles accessible to change and evolution, too. On top, 
the benefit factors could become a part of an evolutionary process as 
function of the output of other ensembles. The benefit factors ascending 
the pyramid must not necessarily increase along their path and the 
complexity may introduce additional cost. Some of those building blocks 
may stay interchangeable while others become of unique function and 
location. The degree of integration correlates here with a loss of 
exchangeability. 
The way how a certain inequality and asymmetry evolves from equality 
and partial or complete symmetry but also from a complete opposite 
asymmetry has been investigated here. The different degree of substrate 
saturation of two identical compartments is sufficient to start an 
asymmetric relationship. As soon as we observe a source and a sink 
within an ensemble there will be asymmetry; even if all other internal 
parameters are identical and symmetric. Not necessarily the external 
asymmetry of substrate distribution but the internal asymmetric structure 
of the transfer space is important. Within the ensemble we find positive 
net profit at low substrate concentration and negative net profit at high 
substrate concentration. This inner asymmetry is detected and amplified 
by the evolutionary process. Evolution starts to increase the asymmetry, 
the beginning of a division of labour, leading to a substrate collector and 
supplier on one side and a substrate consumer and producer on the 
other side. This reminds of a potential difference. The larger the 
difference, the larger the force. The larger the force the more work a 
system can perform. 
I have been locking at the selection pressure on the level of an ensemble 
of ensembles and the net profit there. Only a fully self-contained 
ensemble will behave as described. As soon as selection will also act on 
the single party source or sink or a single ensemble and the net profit 
there a more complex, interdependent behaviour will be observed. The 
degree of isolation of the single party from competition with other, similar 
single parties will determine the intensity of inequality and division of 
labour, too. The degree of asymmetry and division of labour could in 
reverse be used as an indicator to what extend the single party (source 
and sink) is shielded by the ensemble from direct competition. In case 
this protection from competition with other, similar entities is lost the 
ensemble of the weaker entity will be harmed. On the other side the 
ensemble with the weak party may be able to make use of the better 
entity for itself with the price of a strategic dependence (Adam Smith, 
quote: “It is maxim of every prudent master of a family never to attempt 
to make at home what it will cost him more to make than to buy.  … What 
is prudence in the conduct of every private family can scarce be folly in 
that of a great kingdom.”). On top, there may be also harm to the 
ensemble with the stronger party through overextension by an additional 
participant. In a well-balanced ensemble there will be two wrong 
directions. It is easy to disturb a rehearsed team.  
Finally, is it reasonable to choose the increase in net profit as an 
evolutionary bench mark? In short, yes! Many different, even antithetic 
types of net profit are imaginable. In addition, a positive net profit may 
appear as a negative net profit from another point of view because 
benefits and costs depend on their reference systems. The concepts “net 
profit” and “superadditive net profit” are not fixed to money. When we 
look at a positive net profit the benefit will be larger than the cost. A 
superadditive net profit is more net profit of an ensemble than simple 
additivity of net profit by two parties not transferring substrate at a certain 
concentration pair. A benefit is something to prefer and more benefit is 
preferable over less benefit but the costs always have to be considered. 
All this emerges from non-linearity. However, non-linearity is not a 
miracle it is a natural feature never violating the conservation laws. 
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